ANIMA WG
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. von Oheimb, Ed.
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 9733 S. Fries
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track H. Brockhaus
Expires: 21 March 2025
ISSN: 2070-1721 Siemens
17 September 2024
February 2025
BRSKI-AE: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure with
Alternative Enrollment Protocols in BRSKI
draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-13
Abstract
This document defines enhancements to the Bootstrapping Remote Secure
Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol, known as BRSKI-AE (Alternative
Enrollment). BRSKI with Alternative
Enrollment (BRSKI-AE). BRSKI-AE extends BRSKI to support certificate
enrollment mechanisms instead of the originally specified use of EST.
Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST). It supports certificate
enrollment protocols, protocols such as CMP, the Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP) that use authenticated self-contained signed objects for
certification messages, allowing for flexibility in network device
onboarding scenarios. The enhancements address use cases where the
existing enrollment mechanism may not be feasible or optimal,
providing a framework for integrating suitable alternative enrollment
protocols. This document also updates the BRSKI reference
architecture to accommodate these alternative methods, ensuring
secure and scalable deployment across a range of network
environments.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Supported Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Abbreviations
3. Basic Requirements and Mapping to Solutions . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Solution Options for Proof of Possession . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Solution Options for Proof of Identity . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Adaptations to BRSKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Message Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.1. Pledge - Registrar Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.2. Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Exchange . . . . . 15
4.2.3. Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Status Telemetry . 15
4.2.4. Pledge - Registrar - RA/CA Certificate Enrollment . . 16
4.2.5. Pledge - Registrar Enrollment Status Telemetry . . . 19
4.3. Enhancements to the Endpoint Addressing Scheme of BRSKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. Instantiation with Existing Enrollment Protocols . . . . . . 21
5.1. BRSKI-CMP: BRSKI-AE instantiated Instantiated with CMP . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Support of Other Enrollment Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1.
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2.
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Application Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.1. Rolling Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.2. Building Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.3. Substation Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A.4. Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure . . . . . . . . 30
A.5. Infrastructure Isolation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.6. Sites with Insufficient Level Levels of Operational Security . . 31
Appendix B. History of Changes TBD RFC Editor: please delete . . 31
Acknowledgments
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1. Introduction
BRSKI
Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) [RFC8995] is
typically used with Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST, [RFC7030]) (EST) [RFC7030]
as the enrollment protocol for operator-
specific operator-specific device certificates,
employing HTTP over TLS for secure message transfer. BRSKI-AE is a
variant using alternative enrollment protocols with authenticated
self-contained objects for the device certificate enrollment.
This approach offers several distinct advantages. It allows for the
authentication of the origin of requests and responses independently
of message transfer mechanisms. This capability facilitates end-to-
end authentication (i.e., end-to-end proof of origin) across multiple
transport hops and supports the asynchronous operation of certificate
enrollment. Consequently, this provides architectural flexibility in
determining the location and timing for the ultimate authentication
and authorization of certification requests, requests while ensuring that the
integrity and authenticity of the enrollment messages is are maintained
with full cryptographic strength.
This specification carries over the main characteristics of BRSKI,
namely:
* The pledge is assumed to have received its Initial Device
IDentifier (IDevID, [IEEE_802.1AR-2018])
Identifier (IDevID) [IEEE_802.1AR-2018] credentials during its
manufacturing. It uses them to authenticate itself to the
Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA, [RFC8995]), (MASA) [RFC8995] and
to the registrar, which
registrar (which is the access point of the target domain, domain) and to
possibly further components of the domain where it will be
operated.
* The pledge first obtains via the voucher [RFC8366] exchange [RFC8366] a
trust anchor for authenticating entities in the domain such as the
domain registrar.
* The pledge then obtains its Locally significant Local Device IDentifier
(IDevID, [IEEE_802.1AR-2018]). Identifier (LDevID)
[IEEE_802.1AR-2018]. To this end, the pledge generates a private
key, called LDevID secret, and an "LDevID secret". Then, it requests via the domain
registrar from the PKI of its new domain a domain-specific device
certificate, called LDevID certificate. an "LDevID certificate". On success, it
receives the LDevID certificate along with its certificate chain.
The objectives of BRSKI-AE are to enhance BRSKI by enabling LDevID
certificate enrollment through the use of an alternative protocol to
EST that:
* Supports supports end-to-end authentication over multiple transport hops. hops
and
* Facilitates facilitates secure message exchange exchanges over any type of transfer
mechanism, including asynchronous delivery.
It may be observed that the BRSKI voucher exchange between the
pledge, registrar, and MASA involves the use of authenticated self-
contained objects, which inherently possess these properties.
The existing well-known URI structure used for BRSKI and EST messages
is extended by introducing an additional path element that specifies
the enrollment protocol being employed.
This specification allows the registrar to offer multiple enrollment
protocols, enabling pledges and their developers to select the most
appropriate one based on the defined overall approach and specific
endpoints.
It may be important to note that BRSKI (RFC 8995) [RFC8995] specifies the use of
HTTP over TLS, but variations such as Constrained BRSKI
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] [cBRSKI],
which uses CoAP the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over DTLS, are
possible as well. In this context, 'HTTP' "HTTP" and 'TLS' "TLS" are used as
references to the most common implementation, though variants using
CoAP and/or DTLS are implied where applicable, as the distinctions
are not pertinent here.
This specification, together with its referenced documents, is
sufficient to support BRSKI with the Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP, [RFC9480])
(CMP) [RFC9480] as profiled in the Lightweight CMP Profile (LCMPP,
[RFC9483]). (LCMPP)
[RFC9483]. Integrating BRSKI with an enrollment protocol or profile
other than LCMPP will necessitate additional IANA registrations, as
detailed in this document. Furthermore, additional specifications
may be required for the details of the protocol or profile, which
fall outside the scope of this document.
1.1. Supported Scenarios
BRSKI-AE is designed for use in scenarios such as the following:
* Pledges When pledges and/or the target domain leverage an existing
certificate enrollment protocol other than EST, such as CMP.
* The When the application context precludes the use of EST for
certificate enrollment due to factors such as: as when:
- The Registration Authority (RA) is not co-located with the
registrar and requires end-to-end authentication of requesters,
which EST does not support over multiple transport hops.
- The RA or Certification Authority (CA) operator mandates
auditable proof of origin for Certificate Signing Requests
(CSRs), which cannot be provided by TLS as it only offers
transient source authentication.
- Certificates are requested for key types, such as Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) keys, that do not support signing
or other single-shot proof-of-possession methods, methods as those
described in [RFC6955]. EST, which relies on CSRs in PKCS #10
[RFC2986] format,
format [RFC2986], does not accommodate these key types because
it necessitates proof-of-possession methods that operate within
a single message, whereas proof of possession for KEM keys
requires prior receipt of a fresh challenge value.
- The pledge implementation employs security libraries that do
not support EST or uses a TLS library lacking support for the
"tls-unique" value [RFC5929], which EST requires for the strong
binding of source authentication.
* Full When full RA functionality is not available on-site within the
target domain, and connectivity to an off-site RA may be
intermittent or entirely offline.
* Authoritative When authoritative actions by a local RA at the registrar are
insufficient for fully and reliably authorizing pledge
certification requests, potentially due to a lack of access to
necessary data or inadequate security measures, such as the local
storage of private keys.
Bootstrapping may be managed in various ways depending on the
application domain. Appendix A provides illustrative examples from
different industrial control system environments and operational
contexts that motivate the support of alternative enrollment
protocols.
2. Terminology and abbreviations Abbreviations
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document relies on the terminology defined in [RFC8995],
[RFC5280], and [IEEE_802.1AR-2018], which is partly repeated here. Also
several
Several further terms are also described here.
To be independent of the terminology of a specific enrollment
protocol, this document utilizes generic terminology regarding PKI
management operations.
asynchronous: the time-wise interrupted delivery of messages,
here here,
between a pledge and some backend system (e.g., an RA) RA).
attribute request: a message requesting content to be included in
the certification request request.
attribute response: a message providing the answer to the attribute
request
request.
authenticated self-contained object: a data structure that is
cryptographically bound to the identity of its originator by an
attached digital signature on the actual object, using a private
key of the originator such as the IDevID secret.
backend: the placement of a domain component separately from the
domain registrar; it may be on-site or off-site off-site.
BRSKI: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure [RFC8995]
BRSKI-AE: BRSKI with *A*lternative *E*nrollment, Alternative Enrollment. Refers to a variation
of BRSKI [RFC8995] in which BRSKI-EST, the enrollment protocol
between the pledge and the registrar, is replaced by enrollment
protocols that support end-to-end authentication of the pledge to
the RA, such as Lightweight CMP (see LCMPP).
CA: Certification Authority
CA certs request: a message requesting CA certificates certificates.
CA certs response: a message providing the answer to a CA certs
request
request.
certificate confirm: a message stating to the backend PKI that the
requester of a certificate received the new certificate and
accepted it it.
certification request: a message requesting a certificate with proof
of identity identity.
certification response: a message providing the answer to a
certification request request.
CMP: Certificate Management Protocol [RFC4210] [RFC9480]
CSR: Certificate Signing Request
EST: Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030]
IDevID: Initial Device IDentifier of Identifier (of a pledge, provided by the
manufacturer and comprising of a private key and the related X.509
certificate with its chain chain).
LCMPP: Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483]
LDevID: Locally significant Local Device IDentifier of Identifier (of a pledge, provided by its target
domain and comprising of a private key and the related X.509
certificate with its chain
local RA (LRA): a chain).
LRA: Local Registration Authority. A subordinate RA that is close
to entities being enrolled and separate from a subsequent RA. In BRSKI-AE
BRSKI-AE, it is needed if a backend RA is used, and used; in this case, the
LRA is co-
located co-located with the registrar.
MASA: Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority, provides vouchers Authority. Provides vouchers.
off-site: the locality of component or service a component, service, or functionality, such functionality
(such as RA or CA, CA) that is not at the site of the registrar. This
may be a central site or a cloud service, to which connection may
be intermittent.
on-site: the locality of a component or service component, service, or functionality at
the site of the registrar registrar.
PKI/registrar confirm: an acknowledgment of the PKI on the
certificate
confirm confirm.
pledge: a device that is to be bootstrapped into a target domain.
It requests an LDevID using IDevID credentials installed by its
manufacturer.
RA: Registration Authority, the Authority. The PKI component to which a CA
typically delegates certificate management functions such as
authenticating pledges and performing authorization checks on
certification requests requests.
registrar: short for domain registrar registrar.
site: the locality where an entity, entity such as a pledge, registrar, or
PKI component is deployed. The target domain may have multiple
sites.
synchronous: the time-wise uninterrupted delivery of messages, here here,
between a pledge and a registrar or backend system (e.g., the
MASA)
MASA).
target domain: the domain that a pledge is going to be bootstrapped
into
into.
3. Basic Requirements and Mapping to Solutions
Based on the intended target scenarios described in Section 1.1 and
the application examples described in Appendix A, the following
requirements are derived to support authenticated self-contained
objects as containers carrying certification requests.
The following properties are required for a certification request:
* Proof of possession: demonstrates access to the private key
corresponding to the public key contained in a certification
request. This is typically achieved by a self-signature using the
corresponding private key but can also be achieved indirectly, indirectly; see
[RFC4210], Section 4.3.
* Proof of identity, also identity (also called proof "proof of origin: origin"): provides data
origin authentication of the certification request. Typically,
this is achieved by a signature using the pledge IDevID secret
over some data, which needs to include a sufficiently strong
identifier of the pledge, such as the device serial number
typically included in the subject of the IDevID certificate.
The remainder of this section gives a non-exhaustive list of solution
examples, based on existing technology described in IETF documents.
3.1. Solution Options for Proof of Possession
Certificate signing request Signing Request (CSR) objects: CSRs objects are data structures
protecting only the integrity of the contained data and providing
proof of possession for a (locally generated) private key. Important
types of CSR data structures are:
* PKCS #10 [RFC2986]. [RFC2986]: This very common form of CSR is self-signed to
protect its integrity and to prove possession of the private key
that corresponds to the public key included in the request.
* Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF, [RFC4211]). (CRMF) [RFC4211]: This less
common but more general CSR format supports several ways of
integrity protection and proof of possession. Typically a self-
signature is used, which is generated over (part of) the structure
with the private key corresponding to the included public key.
CRMF also supports further proof-of-possession methods for types
of keys that do not have signing capability. For details details, see
[RFC4211], Section 4.
It should be noted that the integrity protection of CSRs includes the
public key because it is part of the data signed by the corresponding
private key. Yet Yet, this signature does not provide data origin
authentication, i.e., (i.e., proof of identity of the requester requester) because
the key pair involved is new and therefore does not yet have a
confirmed identity associated with it.
3.2. Solution Options for Proof of Identity
Binding a certificate signing request Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to an existing
authenticated credential (the BRSKI context, the IDevID certificate)
enables proof of origin, which in turn supports an authorization
decision on the CSR.
The binding of data origin authentication to the CSR is typically
delegated to the protocol used for certificate management. This
binding may be achieved through security options in an underlying
transport protocol such as TLS if the authorization of the
certification request is (sufficiently) done at the next
communication hop. Depending on the key type, the binding can also
be done in a stronger, transport-independent way by wrapping the CSR
with a signature.
This requirement is addressed by existing enrollment protocols in
various ways, such as:
* EST [RFC7030], also [RFC7030] and its variant EST-coaps [RFC9148], utilizes [RFC9148] utilize PKCS #10
to encode Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs). CSRs. While such a CSR has not been designed to include
proof of origin, there is a limited, indirect way of binding it to
the source authentication of the underlying TLS session. This is
achieved by including in the CSR the tls-unique value [RFC5929]
resulting from the TLS handshake. As this is optionally supported
by the EST "/simpleenroll" endpoint used in BRSKI BRSKI, and the TLS
handshake employed in BRSKI includes certificate-based client
authentication of the pledge with its IDevID credentials, the
proof of pledge identity being an authenticated TLS client can be
bound to the CSR.
Yet
Yet, this binding is only valid in the context of the TLS session
established with the registrar acting as the EST server and
typically also as an RA. So even such a cryptographic binding of
the authenticated pledge identity to the CSR is not visible nor
verifiable to authorization points outside the registrar, such as
a (second) RA in the backend. What the registrar needs to do is
to
authenticate and pre-authorize the pledge and to indicate this to the
(second) RA RA. This is done by signing the forwarded certification
request with its private key and a related certificate that has
the id-kp-
cmcRA id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage attribute.
[RFC7030], Section 2.5 sketches wrapping PKCS #10-formatted CSRs
with a Full PKI Request message sent to the "/fullcmc" endpoint.
This would allow for source authentication at the message level,
such that the registrar could forward it to external RAs in a
meaningful way. This approach is so far not sufficiently
described and likely has not been implemented.
* SCEP The Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol (SCEP) [RFC8894]
supports using a shared secret (passphrase) or an existing
certificate to protect CSRs based on SCEP Secure Message Objects
using CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapping ([RFC5652]). [RFC5652]. Note
that the wrapping using an existing IDevID in SCEP is referred to
as 'renewal'. "renewal". This way way, SCEP does not rely on the security of the
underlying message transfer.
* CMP [RFC4210] [RFC9480] supports using a shared secret
(passphrase) or an existing certificate, which may be an IDevID
credential, to authenticate certification requests via the
PKIProtection structure in a PKIMessage. The certification
request is typically encoded utilizing CRMF, while PKCS #10 is
supported as an alternative. Thus, CMP does not rely on the
security of the underlying message transfer.
* CMC Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) [RFC5272] also supports
utilizing a shared secret (passphrase) or an existing certificate
to protect certification requests, which can be either in a CRMF
or PKCS #10 structure. The proof of identity can be provided as
part of a FullCMCRequest, FullCMCRequest based on CMS [RFC5652] and signed with an
existing IDevID secret. Thus, CMC does not rely on the security
of the underlying message transfer.
To sum up, EST does not meet the requirements for authenticated self-
contained objects, but SCEP, CMP, and CMC do. This document
primarily focuses on CMP as it has more industry adoption than CMC
and SCEP has issues not detailed here.
4. Adaptations to BRSKI
To enable using alternative certificate enrollment protocols
supporting end-to-end authentication, asynchronous enrollment, and
more general system architectures, BRSKI-AE provides some
generalizations on BRSKI [RFC8995]. This way, authenticated self-
contained objects such as those described in Section 3 above can be
used for certificate enrollment, and RA functionality can be deployed
freely in the target domain. Parts of the RA functionality can even
be distributed over several nodes.
The enhancements are kept to a minimum to ensure the reuse of already
defined architecture elements and interactions. In general, the
communication follows the BRSKI model and utilizes the existing BRSKI
architecture elements. In particular, the pledge initiates
communication with the domain registrar and interacts with the MASA
as usual for voucher request and response processing.
4.1. Architecture
The key element of BRSKI-AE is that the authorization of a
certification request MUST be performed based on an authenticated
self-contained object. The certification request is bound in a self-
contained way to a proof of origin based on the IDevID credentials.
Consequently, the certification request MAY be transferred using any
mechanism or protocol. Authentication and authorization of the
certification request can be done by the domain registrar and/or by
backend domain components. As mentioned in Section 1.1, these
components may be offline or off-site. The registrar and other on-
site domain components may have no or only temporary (intermittent)
connectivity to them.
This leads to generalizations in the placement and enhancements of
the logical elements as shown in Figure 1.
+------------------------+
+--------------Drop-Ship--------------| Vendor Service |
| +------------------------+
| | M anufacturer| |
| | A uthorized |Ownership|
| | S igning |Tracker |
| | A uthority | |
| +--------------+---------+
| ^
| |
V | BRSKI-
+--------+ ......................................... | MASA
| | . . |
| | . +-------+ +--------------+ . |
| Pledge | . | Join | | Domain |<----+
| |<------>| Proxy |<-------->| Registrar | .
| | . | | | w/ LRA or RA | .
| IDevID | . +-------+ +--------------+ .
| | BRSKI-AE over TLS ^ .
+--------+ using, e.g., LCMPP | .
. | .
...............................|.........
on-site (local) domain components |
|
| e.g., LCMPP
|
.............................................|...............
. Public-Key Infrastructure v .
. +---------+ +---------------------------------------+ .
. | |<----+ Registration Authority RA | .
. | CA +---->| (unless part of Domain Registrar) | .
. +---------+ +---------------------------------------+ .
.............................................................
backend (central or off-site) domain components
Figure 1: Architecture Overview Using Backend PKI Components
The architecture overview in Figure 1 has the same logical elements
as BRSKI, BRSKI but with a more flexible placement of the authentication and
authorization checks on certification requests. Depending on the
application scenario, the registrar MAY still do all of these checks
(as is the case in BRSKI), BRSKI) or only do part of them.
The following list describes the on-site components in the target
domain of the pledge shown in Figure 1.
* Join Proxy: This has the same requirements as in BRSKI, see BRSKI (see
[RFC8995], Section 4 4).
* Domain Registrar including (including LRA or RA functionality: in functionality): In BRSKI-AE,
the domain registrar has mostly the same functionality as in
BRSKI, namely to act as the gatekeeper of the domain for
onboarding new devices and to facilitate the communication of
pledges with their MASA and the domain PKI. Yet Yet, there are some
generalizations and specific requirements:
1. The registrar MUST support at least one certificate enrollment
protocol with authenticated self-contained objects for
certification requests. To this end, the URI scheme for
addressing endpoints at the registrar is generalized (see
Section 4.3).
2. Rather than having full RA functionality, the registrar MAY
act as a local registration authority Local Registration Authority (LRA) and delegate part
of its involvement in certificate enrollment to a backend RA.
In such scenarios, the registrar optionally checks
certification requests it receives from pledges and forwards
them to the backend RA, which performs the remaining parts of
the enrollment request validation and authorization. Note
that to this end end, the backend RA may need information
regarding the authorization of pledges from the registrar or
from other sources. On the way back, the registrar forwards
responses by the PKI to the pledge on the same channel.
To support end-to-end authentication of the pledge across the
registrar to the backend RA, the certification request signed
by the pledge needs to be upheld and forwarded by the
registrar. Therefore, the registrar cannot use for its communication with the PKI PKI, the
registrar cannot use an enrollment protocol that is different
from the enrollment protocol used between the pledge and the
registrar.
3. The use of a certificate enrollment protocol with
authenticated self-contained objects gives freedom with how to
transfer enrollment messages between the pledge and an RA.
BRSKI demands that the RA accept certification requests for
LDevIDs only with the consent of the registrar. BRSKI-AE also
guarantees this also in the case that the RA is not part of the
registrar, even if the message exchange with backend systems
is unprotected and involves further transport hops. See
Section 7 for details on how this can be achieved.
Despite the above generalizations to of the enrollment phase, the final
step of BRSKI, namely the enrollment status telemetry, is kept as it
is.
The following list describes the components provided by the vendor or
manufacturer outside the target domain.
* MASA: This has the functionality as described in BRSKI [RFC8995].
The voucher exchange with the MASA via the domain registrar is
performed as described in BRSKI.
Note: From the definition of the interaction with the MASA in
[RFC8995], Section 5 follows that it may be synchronous (using
voucher request requests with nonces) or asynchronous (using nonceless
voucher requests).
* Ownership tracker: Tracker: This is as defined in BRSKI.
The following list describes backend target domain components, which
may be located on-site or off-site in the target domain.
* RA: This performs centralized certificate management functions as
a public-key infrastructure for the domain operator. As far as
not already done by the domain registrar, it performs the final
validation and authorization of certification requests.
Otherwise, the RA co-located with the domain registrar directly
connects to the CA.
* CA, also CA (also called domain CA: "domain CA"): This generates domain-specific
certificates according to certification requests that have been
authenticated and authorized by the registrar and/or an extra RA.
Based on the diagram in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 2.1 and the
architectural changes, the original protocol flow is divided into
several phases showing commonalities and differences to with the
original approach as follows.
* Discovery phase: This is mostly as in BRSKI step (1). (1) of [RFC8995]. For details
details, see Section 4.2.1.
* Identification phase: This is the same as in BRSKI step (2). (2) of
[RFC8995].
* Voucher exchange phase: This is the same as in BRSKI steps (3) and (4). (4)
of [RFC8995].
* Voucher status telemetry: This is the same as in BRSKI directly after step
(4).
(4) in [RFC8995].
* Certificate enrollment phase: the The use of EST in step (5) is
changed to employing a certificate enrollment protocol that uses
an authenticated self-contained object for requesting the LDevID
certificate.
For transporting the certificate enrollment request and response
messages, the (D)TLS channel established between pledge and
registrar is REQUIRED to use. To this end, the enrollment
protocol, the pledge, and the registrar need to support the use of
this existing channel for certificate enrollment. Due to this
architecture, the pledge does not need to establish additional
connections for certificate enrollment and the registrar retains
full control over the certificate enrollment traffic.
* Enrollment status telemetry: This is the final exchange of BRSKI step (5).
(5) of [RFC8995].
4.2. Message Exchange
The behavior of a pledge described in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 2.1 is
kept, with one major exception. After finishing the Imprint step
(4), the Enroll step (5) MUST be performed with an enrollment
protocol utilizing authenticated self-contained objects, as explained
in Section 3. Section 5 discusses selected suitable enrollment
protocols and options applicable.
An abstract overview of the BRSKI-AE protocol can be found at
[BRSKI-AE-overview].
[BRSKI-AE-OVERVIEW].
4.2.1. Pledge - Registrar Discovery
Discovery as specified in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 4 does not support
the discovery of registrars with enhanced feature sets. A pledge can
not
cannot find out in this way whether discovered registrars support the
certificate enrollment protocol it expects, such as CMP.
As a more general solution, the BRSKI discovery mechanism can be
extended to provide up-front information on the capabilities of
registrars. For further discussion, see
[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery]. [BRSKI-DISCOVERY].
In the absence of such a generally applicable solution, BRSKI-AE
deployments may use their particular way of doing discovery.
Section 5.1 defines a minimalist approach that MAY be used for CMP.
4.2.2. Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Exchange
The voucher exchange is performed as specified in [RFC8995].
4.2.3. Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Status Telemetry
The voucher status telemetry is performed as specified in [RFC8995],
Section 5.7.
4.2.4. Pledge - Registrar - RA/CA Certificate Enrollment
This replaces the EST integration for PKI bootstrapping described in
[RFC8995], Section 5.9 (while [RFC8995], Section 5.9.4 remains as the
final phase, phase; see below).
The certificate enrollment phase may involve the transmission of
several messages. Details can depend on the application scenario,
the employed enrollment protocol, and other factors.
The only message exchange REQUIRED is for the actual certification
request and response. Further message exchanges MAY be performed as
needed.
Note: The message exchanges marked OPTIONAL in the below Figure 2 below cover
all those supported by the use of EST in BRSKI. The last OPTIONAL
one, namely certificate confirmation, is not supported by
EST, EST but by
CMP and other enrollment protocols.
+------+ +---------+ +--------+
|Pledge| |Domain | |Operator|
| | |Registrar| |RA/CA |
| | |(JRC) | |(PKI) |
+------+ +---------+ +--------+
| | |
|[OPTIONAL request of CA certificates]| |
|------- CA Certs Request (1) ------->| |
| | [OPTIONAL forwarding] |
| |--- CA Certs Request ----->|
| |<-- CA Certs Response -----|
|<------ CA Certs Response (2) -------| |
| | |
|[OPTIONAL request of attributes | |
| to include in Certification Request]| |
|------- Attribute Request (3) ------>| |
| | [OPTIONAL forwarding] |
| |--- Attribute Request ---->|
| |<-- Attribute Response ----|
|<------ Attribute Response (4) ------| |
| | |
|[REQUIRED certification request] | |
|------- Certification Request (5) -->| |
| | [OPTIONAL forwarding] |
| |---Certification Request-->|
| |<--Certification Resp. ---|
|<----- Certification Response (6) ---| |
| | |
|[OPTIONAL certificate confirmation] | |
|------- Certificate Confirm (7) ---->| |
| | [OPTIONAL forwarding] |
| |--- Certificate Confirm--->|
| |<-- PKI Confirm -----------|
|<------ PKI/Registrar Confirm (8) ---| |
Figure 2: Certificate Enrollment Message Flow
It may be noted that connections between the registrar and the PKI
components of the operator (RA, CA, etc.) may be intermittent or off-
line.
offline. Messages should be sent as soon as sufficient transfer
capacity is available.
The label [OPTIONAL forwarding] in Figure 2 means that on receiving
from a pledge a
request message of the given type, type from a pledge, the registrar MAY
answer the request directly. In this case, it MUST authenticate its
responses with the same credentials as used for authenticating itself
at the TLS level for the voucher exchange. Otherwise, the registrar
MUST forward the request to the RA and forward any resulting response
back to the pledge.
The decision of whether to forward a request or to answer it directly
can depend on various static and dynamic factors. They include the
application scenario, the capabilities of the registrar and of the
local RA possibly co-located with the registrar, the enrollment
protocol being used, and the specific contents of the request.
Note that there are several options for how the registrar could be
able to directly answer requests for CA certificates or for
certification request attributes. It could cache responses obtained
from the domain PKI and later use their contents for responding to
requests asking for the same data. The contents could also be
explicitly provisioned at the registrar.
Further note that certification requests typically need to be handled
by the backend PKI, but the registrar can answer them directly with
an error response in case it determines that such a request should be
rejected, for instance, because it is not properly authenticated or not
authorized.Also,
authorized. Also, certificate confirmation messages will usually be
forwarded to the backend PKI, but if the registrar knows that they
are not needed or wanted there there, it can acknowledge such messages
directly.
The following list provides an abstract description of the flow
depicted in Figure 2.
* CA Certs Request (1): The pledge optionally requests the latest
relevant CA certificates. This ensures that the pledge has the
complete set of current CA certificates beyond the pinned-domain-
cert (which is contained in the voucher and which may be just the
domain registrar certificate).
* CA Certs Response (2): This MUST contain any intermediate CA
certificates that the pledge may need to validate certificates and
MAY contain the LDevID trust anchor.
* Attribute Request (3): Typically, the automated bootstrapping
occurs without local administrative configuration of the pledge.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which the pledge may also include
in the Certification Request (5)
additional attributes that are specific to the target domain. domain in
the Certification Request (5). To get these attributes in
advance, the attribute request may be used.
* Attribute Response (4): This MUST contain the attributes requested
in (3) to be included in the subsequent Certification Request (5).
For example, [RFC8994], Section 6.11.7.2 specifies how the
attribute request is used to signal to the pledge the acp-node-
name field required for enrollment into an ACP Autonomic Control Plane
(ACP) domain.
* Certification Request (5): This MUST contain the authenticated
self-contained object ensuring both the proof of possession of the
corresponding private key and the proof of identity of the
requester.
* Certification Response (6): This On success, this MUST contain on success the
requested certificate and MAY include further information, like
certificates of intermediate CAs and any additional trust anchors.
* Certificate Confirm (7): An This is an optional confirmation that is
sent after the requested certificate has been received and
validated. If sent, it MUST contain a positive or negative
confirmation by the pledge to the PKI whether the certificate was
successfully enrolled and fits its needs.
* PKI/Registrar Confirm (8): An This is an acknowledgment by the PKI
that MUST be sent on reception of the Certificate Confirm.
The generic messages described above may be implemented using any
certificate enrollment protocol that supports authenticated self-
contained objects for the certification request as described in
Section 3. Examples are available in Section 5.
Note that the optional certificate confirmation by the pledge to the
PKI described above is independent of the mandatory enrollment status
telemetry done between the pledge and the registrar in the final
phase of BRSKI-AE, which is described next.
4.2.5. Pledge - Registrar Enrollment Status Telemetry
The enrollment status telemetry is performed as specified in
[RFC8995], Section 5.9.4.
In BRSKI BRSKI, this is described as part of the certificate enrollment
step, but due to the generalization on of the enrollment protocol
described in this document document, it is regarded as a separate phase here.
4.3. Enhancements to the Endpoint Addressing Scheme of BRSKI
BRSKI-AE extends the addressing scheme outlined in [RFC8995],
Section 5, 5 to support alternative enrollment protocols that utilize
authenticated, self-contained objects for certification requests --
(also see also Section 5). These extensions are designed to be compatible
with existing Registration Authorities (RAs) and Certification
Authorities (CAs) that already support such enrollment protocols,
enabling their use without requiring any modifications.
The addressing scheme in BRSKI for certification requests and the requests, related CA certificates
certificates, and CSR attributes retrieval functions uses the
definition from EST [RFC7030]. Here is the An example of simple
enrollment: enrollment is:
"/.well-known/est/simpleenroll". This approach is generalized to the
following notation: "/.well-known/<enrollment-
protocol>/<request>" "/.well-known/<enrollment-protocol>/<request>" in
which <enrollment-protocol> refers to a certificate enrollment
protocol. Note that here, enrollment is considered
here a message
sequence that contains at least a certification request and a
certification response. The following conventions are used to
provide maximal compatibility with BRSKI:
* <enrollment-protocol>: This MUST reference the protocol being
used. Existing values include 'est' [RFC7030] as in BRSKI and
'cmp' as in [RFC9483] and Section 5.1 below. Values for other
existing protocols such as CMC and SCEP, as well as for newly defined
protocols
protocols, are outside the scope of this document. For use of the
<enrollment-protocol> and <request> URI components, they would
need to be specified in a suitable RFC and placed into the Well- "Well-
Known URIs URIs" registry, just as EST in [RFC7030].
* <request>: if If present, this path component MUST describe, describe the
operation requested depending on the enrollment protocol being used, the operation
requested.
used. Enrollment protocols are expected to define their request
endpoints, as is done by existing protocols (see also (also see Section 5).
Well-known URIs for various endpoints on the domain registrar are
already defined as part of the base BRSKI specification or indirectly
by EST. In addition, alternative enrollment endpoints MAY be
supported by the registrar.
A pledge SHOULD use the endpoints defined for the enrollment
protocol(s) that it can use. It will recognize whether the protocol
it uses and the specific request it wants to perform are understood
and supported by the domain registrar registrar. This is done by sending the
request to the respective endpoint according to the above addressing
scheme and then evaluating the HTTP status code of the response. If
the pledge uses endpoints that are not standardized, it risks that
the registrar does not recognize a request and thus may reject it, it
even if the registrar supports the intended protocol and operation.
The following list of endpoints provides an illustrative example of a
domain registrar supporting several options for EST as well as for
CMP to be used in BRSKI-AE. The listing contains the supported
endpoints to which the pledge may connect for bootstrapping. This
includes the voucher handling as well as the enrollment endpoints.
The CMP-related enrollment endpoints are defined as well-known URIs
in CMP Updates [RFC9480] and the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
/.well-known/brski/voucherrequest
/.well-known/brski/voucher_status
/.well-known/brski/enrollstatus
/.well-known/est/cacerts
/.well-known/est/csrattrs
/.well-known/est/fullcmc
/.well-known/cmp/getcacerts
/.well-known/cmp/getcertreqtemplate
/.well-known/cmp/initialization
/.well-known/cmp/pkcs10
5. Instantiation with Existing Enrollment Protocols
This section maps the generic requirements to support proof of
possession and proof of identity to selected existing certificate
enrollment protocols and specifies further aspects of using such
enrollment protocols in BRSKI-AE.
5.1. BRSKI-CMP: BRSKI-AE instantiated Instantiated with CMP
In this document, references to CMP follow the Lightweight CMP
Profile (LCMPP) [RFC9483] rather than [RFC4210] and [RFC9480], as the
subset of CMP defined in LCMPP sufficiently meets the required
functionality.
Adherence to the LCMPP [RFC9483] is REQUIRED when using CMP. The
following specific requirements apply (refer to Figure 2):
* The validation of server response messages performed by the CMP
client within the pledge MUST be based on the trust anchor
established beforehand via the BRSKI voucher, i.e., on the pinned-
domain-cert.
Note that the integrity and authenticity checks on the RA/CA by
the CMP client can be stronger than for EST because they do not
need to be performed hop-by-hop, hop-by-hop but are usually end-to-end.
* CA Certs Request (1) and Response (2): Requesting CA certificates
is OPTIONAL. If supported, it SHALL be implemented as specified
in [RFC9483], Section 4.3.1.
* Attribute Request (3) and Response (4): Requesting certification
request attributes is OPTIONAL. If supported, it SHALL be
implemented as specified in [RFC9483], Section 4.3.3.
Alternatively, the registrar MAY modify the requested certificate
contents as specified in [RFC9483], Section 5.2.3.2.
* Certification Request (5) and Response (6): Certificates SHALL be
requested and provided as specified in LCMPP [RFC9483],
Section 4.1.1 (based on CRMF) or [RFC9483], Section 4.1.4 (based
on PKCS #10).
Proof of possession SHALL be provided in a manner suitable for the
key type. Proof of identity SHALL be provided by signature-based
protection of the certification request message as outlined in
[RFC9483], Section 3.2, 3.2 using the IDevID secret.
When the registrar forwards a certification request from the
pledge to a backend RA/CA, it is RECOMMENDED that the registrar
wraps the original certification request in a nested message
signed with its own credentials, as described in [RFC9483],
Section 5.2.2.1. This approach explicitly conveys the registrar's
consent to the RA while retaining the original certification
request with the proof of origin provided by the pledge's
signature.
If additional trust anchors, anchors beyond the pinned-domain-cert, pinned-domain-cert need to
be conveyed to the pledge, this SHOULD be done in the caPubs field
of the certification response rather than through a CA Certs
Response.
* Certificate Confirm (7) and PKI/Registrar Confirm (8): Explicit
confirmation of new certificates to the RA/CA MAY be used as
specified in [RFC9483], Section 4.1.1.
Note that independent of the certificate confirmation within CMP,
enrollment status telemetry with the registrar at the BRSKI level
will be performed as described in [RFC8995], Section 5.9.4.
* If delayed delivery of CMP messages is needed (e.g., to support
enrollment over an asynchronous channel), it SHALL be performed as
specified in Section Sections 4.4 and Section 5.1.2 of [RFC9483].
The mechanisms for exchanging messages between the registrar and
backend PKI components (i.e., RA and/or CA) are outside the scope of
this document. CMP's independence from the message transfer
mechanism allows for flexibility in choosing the appropriate exchange
method based on the application scenario. For the applicable
security and privacy considerations, refer to Section Sections 7 and
Section 8.
Further guidance can be found in [RFC9483], Section 6.
BRSKI-AE with CMP can also be combined with Constrained BRSKI
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher],
[cBRSKI], using CoAP for enrollment message transport as described by
CoAP Transport Transfer for CMP [RFC9482]. In such scenarios, the EST-specific
parts of
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] [cBRSKI] do not apply.
For BRSKI-AE scenarios where a general solution for discovering
registrars with CMP support is not available (cf. Section 4.2.1), the
following minimalist approach MAY be used: perform Perform discovery as
defined in BRSKI [RFC8995], Appendix B, but use the service name
"brski-reg-cmp" (as defined in Section 6) instead of "brski-
registrar" (as defined in [RFC8995], Section 8.6). Note that this
approach does not support join proxies.
5.2. Support of Other Enrollment Protocols
Further instantiations of BRSKI-AE can be done. They are left for
future work.
In particular, CMC [RFC5272] (using its in-band source authentication
options) and SCEP [RFC8894] (using its 'renewal' option) could be
used.
The fullCMC variant of EST sketched in [RFC7030], Section 2.5 might
also be used here. For EST-fullCMC EST-fullCMC, further specification is
necessary.
6. IANA Considerations
This document requires one
IANA action: register has registered the following service name in the Service "Service Name
and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
names-port-numbers.xhtml) the following service name.
*Service Name:* Registry"
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
names-port-numbers.xhtml>.
Service Name: brski-reg-cmp
*Transport Protocol(s):*
Transport Protocol(s): tcp
*Assignee:* IESG iesg@ietf.org (mailto:iesg@ietf.org)
*Contact:* IETF chair@ietf.org (mailto:chair@ietf.org)
*Description:*
Description: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure
registrar with CMP capabilities according to the Lightweight CMP
Profile (LCMPP, [RFC9483])
*Reference:* [THISRFC] (LCMPP) [RFC9483]
Assignee: IESG iesg@ietf.org (mailto:iesg@ietf.org)
Contact: IETF chair@ietf.org (mailto:chair@ietf.org)
Reference: RFC 9733
Note: We chose here the suffix "cmp" here rather than some other
abbreviation like "lcmpp" mainly because this document defines the
normative CMP instantiation of BRSKI-AE, which implies adherence to
LCMPP is necessary and sufficient.
7. Security Considerations
The security considerations laid out in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 11
apply to the discovery and voucher exchange as well as for the status
exchange information.
In particular, even if the registrar delegates part or all of its RA
role during certificate enrollment to a separate system, it still
must be made sure that the registrar takes part in the decision on
accepting or declining a request to join the domain, as required in
[RFC8995], Section 5.3. As this pertains also pertains to obtaining a valid
domain-specific certificate, it must be made sure that a pledge can
not
cannot circumvent the registrar in the decision of whether it is
granted an LDevID certificate by the CA. There are various ways how to
fulfill this, including:
* implicit consent consent;
* the registrar signals signaling its consent to the RA out-of-band before
or during the enrollment phase, for instance instance, by entering the
pledge identity in a database. database;
* the registrar provides providing its consent using an extra message that is
transferred on the same channel as the enrollment messages,
possibly in a TLS tunnel. tunnel; and
* the registrar explicitly states stating its consent by signing, in
addition to the pledge, signing the
authenticated self-contained certificate enrollment request message.
message in addition to the pledge.
Note: If EST was used, the registrar could give implicit consent on a
certification request by forwarding the request to a PKI entity using
a connection authenticated with a certificate containing an id-kp-
cmcRA extension.
When CMP is used, the security considerations laid out in the LCMPP
[RFC9483] apply.
8. Privacy Considerations
The privacy considerations laid out in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 10
apply as well.
Note that CMP messages themselves are not encrypted. This may give
eavesdroppers insight into which devices are bootstrapped into the
domain. This in turn In turn, this might also be used to selectively block the
enrollment of certain devices.
To prevent such issues, the underlying message transport channel can
be encrypted. This is already provided by TLS between the pledge and
the registrar, and for the onward exchange with backend systems,
encryption may need to be added.
9. Acknowledgments
We thank Eliot Lear for his contributions as a co-author at an
earlier draft stage.
We thank Brian E. Carpenter, Michael Richardson, and Giorgio
Romanenghi for their input and discussion on use cases and call
flows.
Moreover, we thank Toerless Eckert (document shepherd), Barry Leiba
(SECdir review), Mahesh Jethanandani (IETF area director), Meral
Shirazipour (Gen-ART reviewer), Reshad Rahman (YANGDOCTORS reviewer),
Deb Cooley, Gunter Van de Velde, John Scudder, Murray Kucherawy,
Roman Danyliw, and Éric Vyncke (IESG reviewers), Michael Richardson
(ANIMA design team member), as well as Rajeev Ranjan, Rufus Buschart,
Andreas Reiter, and Szofia Fazekas-Zisch (Siemens colleagues) for
their reviews with suggestions for improvements.
10. References
10.1.
9.1. Normative References
[IEEE_802.1AR-2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9483>.
10.2.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483>.
9.2. Informative References
[BRSKI-AE-overview]
S. Fries and D.
[BRSKI-AE-OVERVIEW]
von Oheimb, "BRSKI-AE Protocol Overview", D., Ed., Fries, S., and H. Brockhaus, "Update
on BRSKI-AE: Alternative Enrollment Protocols in BRSKI",
IETF 116 - ANIMA Working Group Presentation, March 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/116/materials/
slides-116-anima-update-on-brski-ae-alternative-
enrollment-protocols-in-brski-00>. Graphics on slide 4 of
the status update on the BRSKI-AE draft 04 at IETF 116.
[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery]
[BRSKI-DISCOVERY]
Eckert, T. T. and E. Dijk, "Discovery for BRSKI "BRSKI discovery and
variations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
anima-brski-discovery-04, 25 July
anima-brski-discovery-05, 21 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
brski-discovery-04>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
brski-discovery-05>.
[cBRSKI] Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
Dijk, "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (cBRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-25, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-26, 8 July
2024, January
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
anima-constrained-voucher-25>.
anima-constrained-voucher-26>.
[IEC-62351-9]
International Electrotechnical Commission, "IEC 62351 -
Power "Power systems
management and associated information exchange - Data and
communications security - Part 9: Cyber security key
management for power system equipment", IEC 62351-9, 62351-9:2017,
May 2017. 2017, <https://webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/30287>.
[ISO-IEC-15118-2]
International Standardization Organization / International
Electrotechnical Commission, "ISO/IEC 15118-2 Road for Standardization, "Road
vehicles - Vehicle-to-Grid Communication Interface - Part
2: Network and application protocol requirements", ISO/
IEC 15118-2,
ISO 15118-2:2014, April 2014. 2014,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/55366.html>.
[NERC-CIP-005-5]
North American Electric Reliability Council, "Cyber
Security - Electronic Security Perimeter", CIP 005-5,
December 2013.
[OCPP] Open Charge Alliance, "Open Charge Point Protocol 2.0.1
(Draft)", December 2019.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4210>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4211>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5272>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5929>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.
[RFC6955] Schaad, J. and H. Prafullchandra, "Diffie-Hellman Proof-
of-Possession Algorithms", RFC 6955, DOI 10.17487/RFC6955,
May 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6955>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6955>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.
[RFC8894] Gutmann, P., "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol",
RFC 8894, DOI 10.17487/RFC8894, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8894>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8894>.
[RFC8994] Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8994>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8994>.
[RFC9148] van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S.
Raza, "EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with
the Secure Constrained Application Protocol", RFC 9148,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9148, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9148>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9148>.
[RFC9480] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and J. Gray, "Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", RFC 9480,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9480, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9480>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9480>.
[RFC9482] Sahni, M., Ed. and S. Tripathi, Ed., "Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol", RFC 9482, DOI 10.17487/RFC9482,
November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9482>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9482>.
[UNISIG-Subset-137]
UNISIG, "Subset-137; ERTMS/ETCS "ERTMS/ETCS On-line Key Management
FFFIS; V1.0.0", FFFIS", Subset-
137, Version 1.0.0, December 2015,
<https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/filesystem/
ertms/ccs_tsi_annex_a_-_mandatory_specifications/
set_of_specifications_3_etcs_b3_r2_gsm-r_b1/index083_-
_subset-137_v100.pdf>.
http://www.kmc-subset137.eu/index.php/download/
Appendix A. Application Examples
This informative annex provides some detail details about application
examples.
A.1. Rolling Stock
Rolling stock or railroad cars contain a variety of sensors,
actuators, and controllers, which controllers. These communicate within the railroad
car but also exchange information between railroad cars cars, forming a train,
train with track-side equipment, equipment and/or possibly with backend systems.
These devices are typically unaware of backend system connectivity.
Enrolling certificates may be done during maintenance cycles of the
railroad car, car but can already be prepared during operation. Such
asynchronous enrollment will include generating certification
requests, which are collected and later forwarded for processing
whenever the railroad car gets connectivity with the backend PKI of
the operator. The authorization of the certification request is then
done based on the operator's asset/inventory information in the
backend.
UNISIG has included a CMP profile for the enrollment of TLS client
and server X.509 certificates of on-board and track-side components
in the Subset-137 specifying Subset-137, which specifies the ETRAM/ETCS online key
management for train control systems [UNISIG-Subset-137].
A.2. Building Automation
In building automation scenarios, a detached building or the basement
of a building may be equipped with sensors, actuators, and
controllers that are connected to each other in a local network but
with only limited or no connectivity to a central building management
system. This problem may occur during installation time but also
during operation. In such a situation situation, a service technician collects
the necessary data and transfers it between the local network and the
central building management system, e.g., using a laptop or a mobile
phone. This data may comprise parameters and settings required in
the operational phase of the sensors/actuators, like a component
certificate issued by the operator to authenticate against other
components and services.
The collected data may be provided by a domain registrar already
existing in the local network. In this case case, connectivity to the
backend PKI may be facilitated by the service technician's laptop.
Alternatively, the data can also be collected from the pledges
directly and provided to a domain registrar deployed in a different
network in preparation for the operational phase. In this case,
connectivity to the domain registrar may also be facilitated by the
service technician's laptop.
A.3. Substation Automation
In electrical substation automation scenarios, a control center
typically hosts PKI services to issue certificates for Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs) operated in a substation. Communication
between the substation and control center is performed through a
proxy/gateway/DMZ, which terminates protocol flows. Note that
[NERC-CIP-005-5] requires inspection of protocols at the boundary of
a security perimeter (the substation in (in this case). case, the substation). In addition,
security management in substation automation assumes central support
of several enrollment protocols to support the various capabilities
of IEDs from different vendors. The IEC standard IEC62351-9
[IEC-62351-9] specifies for the infrastructure side mandatory support of two enrollment protocols: protocols
for the infrastructure side, SCEP [RFC8894] and EST [RFC7030], while
an Intelligent Electronic Device IED may support only one of them.
A.4. Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure
For electric vehicle charging infrastructure, protocols have been
defined for the interaction between the electric vehicle and the
charging point (e.g., ISO 15118-2 [ISO-IEC-15118-2]) as well as
between the charging point and the charging point operator (e.g. (e.g.,
OCPP [OCPP]). Depending on the authentication model, unilateral or
mutual authentication is required. In both cases, the charging point
uses an X.509 certificate to authenticate itself in TLS channels
between the electric vehicle and the charging point. The management
of this certificate depends, among others, other things, on the selected
backend connectivity protocol. In the case of OCPP, this protocol is
meant to be the only communication protocol between the charging
point and the backend, carrying all information to control the
charging operations and maintain the charging point itself. This
means that the certificate management needs to be handled in-band of
OCPP. This requires the ability to encapsulate the certificate
management messages in a transport-independent way. Authenticated self-
containment
self-containment will support this by allowing the transport without
a separate enrollment protocol, binding the messages to the identity
of the communicating endpoints.
A.5. Infrastructure Isolation Policy
This refers to any case in which network infrastructure is normally
isolated from the Internet as a matter of policy, most likely for
security reasons. In such a case, limited access to external PKI
services will be allowed in carefully controlled short periods of
time, for example
time (for example, when a batch of new devices is deployed, deployed) and
forbidden or prevented at other times.
A.6. Sites with Insufficient Level Levels of Operational Security
The RA performing (at least part of) the authorization of a
certification request is a critical PKI component and therefore
requires higher operational security than components utilizing the
issued certificates for their security features. CAs may also demand
higher security in the registration procedures from RAs, which domain
registrars with co-located RAs may not be able to fulfill.
Especially In
particular, the CA/Browser forum currently increases the security
requirements in the certificate issuance procedures for publicly
trusted certificates, i.e., those placed in trust stores of browsers,
which may be used to connect with devices in the domain. In case the
on-site components of the target domain can not cannot be operated securely
enough for the needs of an RA, this service should be transferred to
an off-site backend component that has a sufficient level of
security.
Appendix B. History of Changes TBD RFC Editor: please delete
List of reviewers:
*
Acknowledgments
We thank Eliot Lear for his contributions as a co-author at an
earlier draft stage.
We thank Brian E. Carpenter, Michael Richardson, and Giorgio
Romanenghi for their input and discussion on use cases and call
flows.
Moreover, we thank Toerless Eckert (document shepherd)
* shepherd); Barry Leiba (SECdir)
*
(SECdir review); Mahesh Jethanandani (IETF area director)
* director); Meral
Shirazipour (Gen-ART reviewer)
* reviewer); Reshad Rahman (YANGDOCTORS reviewer);
Deb Cooley, Gunter Van de Velde, John Scudder, Murray Kucherawy,
Roman Danyliw, and Éric Vyncke (IESG reviewers)
* reviewers); Michael Richardson
(ANIMA design team)
* team member); and Rajeev Ranjan, Rufus Buschart, Szofia Fazekas-Zisch, etc.
(Siemens)
* Reshad Rahman (YANGDOCTORS reviewer). Note that YANGDOCTORS Early
review of 2021-08-15 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-
ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03-yangdoctors-early-rahman-
2021-08-15/) referred to the PRM aspect of draft-ietf-anima-brski-
async-enroll-03 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-
anima-brski-async-enroll/03/). This has been carved out of the
draft to a different one and thus is no more applicable here.
IETF draft ae-12 -> ae-13:
* Due to IANA requirement, shorten service name "brski-registrar-
cmp" to "brski-reg-cmp"
and change contact for service name registration from IESG to IETF
* Address Deb Cooley's DISCUSS by adding an item to the requirements
list Section 5.1 making the source of the initial trust anchor
explicit.
Including the vouchers in Figure 2 would not fit because the
figure has a different scope (namely, certificate enrollment) and
would get overloaded.
* Address Gunter Van de Velde's comments by taking over essentially
all his rewrites of text to help the structure and simplify
reading the content, while keeping the original message, as it
helps improve document quality
* Address John Scudder's comments by tweaking Section 2, fully
alphabetizing terms
* Address Murray Kucherawy's comment by adapting terminology
entries, leaving out 'communication' from 'asynchronous
communication' and 'synchronous communication'
* Address Roman Danyliw's comments by updating reference
I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery to I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery
and adding Section 8, which refers to the BRSKI privacy
considerations.
* Address Éric Vyncke's comment by replacing 'production' by
'manufacturing'
IETF draft ae-11 -> ae-12:
* Fix minor issues introduced during authors' response to the AD
review,
including nits spotted in the Gen-ART review by Meral Shirazipour
IETF draft ae-10 -> ae-11:
* In response to AD review by Mahesh Jethanandani,
- replace most occurrences of 'Note:' by 'Note that' or the like
- move 2nd paragraph of abstract to the introduction
- remove section 1.2 and merge its first paragraph with the
preceding section
- reconsider normative language, replacing one 'may' by 'MAY' in
section 4.1
- fix several ambiguities
Andreas Reiter, and hard-to-read sentences by re-
phrasing them
- make wording more consistent, in particular: 'certification
request'
- fix a number of (mostly grammar) nits
* Improve item on limitations of PKCS#10 regarding keys that cannot
sign
IETF draft ae-09 -> ae-10:
* Add reference to RFC 8633 at first occurrence of 'voucher' (fixes
#37)
* Update reference of CoAP Transfer Szofia Fazekas-Zisch (Siemens colleagues) for CMP from I-D to RFC 9482
* Move RFC 4210 and RFC 9480 references from normative to
informative
* Fix p10 vs. pkcs10 entry in list of example endpoints in
Section 4.3
* Minor fix in Figure 1 and few text tweaks due to Siemens-internal
review
* Extend the list of reviewers and acknowledgments by two Siemens
colleagues
IETF draft ae-08 -> ae-09:
* In response to review by Toerless,
- tweak abstract to make meaning of 'alternative enrollment' more
clear
- expand on first use not "well-known" abbreviations, such as
'EST',
adding also a references on
their first use
- add summary and reason for choosing CMP at end of Section 3.2
- remove paragraph on optimistic discovery in controlled
environments
- mention role of reviewers also in acknowledgments section
* A couple of grammar and spelling fixes
IETF draft ae-07 -> ae-08:
* Update references to service names in Section 5.1
IETF draft ae-06 -> ae-07:
* Update subsections on discovery according to discussion in the
design team
* In Section 5.1, replace 'mandatory' by 'REQUIRED' regarding
adherence to LCMPP,
in response to SECDIR Last Call Review of ae-06 by Barry Leiba
IETF draft ae-05 -> ae-06:
* Extend section on discovery according to discussion in the design
team
* Make explicit that MASA voucher status telemetry is as in BRSKI
* Add note that on delegation, RA may need info on pledge
authorization
IETF draft ae-04 -> ae-05:
* Remove entries from the terminology section that should be clear
from BRSKI
* Tweak use of the terms IDevID and LDevID and replace PKI RA/CA by
RA/CA
* Add the abbreviation 'LCMPP' for Lightweight CMP Profile to the
terminology section
* State clearly in Section 5.1 that LCMPP is mandatory when using
CMP
* Change URL of BRSKI-AE-overview graphics to slide on IETF 116
meeting material
IETF draft ae-03 -> ae-04:
* In response to SECDIR Early Review of ae-03 by Barry Leiba,
- replace 'end-to-end security' by the more clear 'end-to-end
authentication'
- restrict the meaning of the abbreviation 'AE' to 'Alternative
Enrollment'
- replace 'MAY' by 'may' in requirement on delegated registrar
actions
- re-phrase requirement on certification request exchange,
avoiding MANDATORY
- mention that further protocol names need be put in Well-Known
URIs registry
- explain consequence of using non-standard endpoints, not
following SHOULD
- remove requirement that 'caPubs' field in CMP responses SHOULD
NOT be used
- add paragraph in security considerations on additional use of
TLS for CMP
* In response to further internal reviews and suggestions for
generalization,
- significantly cut down the introduction because the original
motivations and most explanations are no more needed and would
just make it lengthy to read
- sort out asynchronous vs. offline transfer, off-site vs.
backend components
- improve description of CSRs and proof of possession vs. proof
of origin
- clarify that the channel between pledge and registrar is not
restricted to TLS, but in connection with constrained BRSKI may
also be DTLS. Also move the references to Constrained BRSKI
and CoAPS to better contexts.
- clarify that the registrar must not be circumvented in the
decision to grant and LDevID, and give hints and
recommendations how to make sure this
- clarify that the cert enrollment phase may involve additional
messages and that BRSKI-AE replaces [RFC8995], Section 5.9
(except Section 5.9.4)
- the certificate enrollment protocol needs to support transport
over (D)TLS only as far as its messages are transported between
pledge and registrar.
- the certificate enrollment protocol chosen between pledge and
registrar needs to be used also for the upstream enrollment
exchange with the PKI only if end-to-end authentication shall
be achieved across the registrar to the PKI.
- add that with CMP, further trust anchors SHOULD be transported
via caPubs
- remove the former Appendix A: "Using EST for Certificate
Enrollment", moving relevant points to the list of scenarios in
Section 1.1: "Supported Scenarios",
- streamline the item on EST in Section 3.2: "Solution Options
for Proof of Identity",
- various minor editorial improvements like making the wording
more consistent
IETF draft ae-02 -> ae-03:
* In response to review by Toerless Eckert,
- many editorial improvements and clarifications as suggested,
such as the comparison to plain BRSKI, the description of
offline vs. synchronous message transfer and enrollment, and
better differentiation of RA flavors.
- clarify that for transporting certificate enrollment messages
between pledge and registrar, the TLS channel established
between these two (via the join proxy) is used and the
enrollment protocol MUST support this.
- clarify that the enrollment protocol chosen between pledge and
registrar MUST also be used for the upstream enrollment
exchange with the PKI.
- extend the description and requirements on how during the
certificate enrollment phase the registrar MAY handle requests
by the pledge itself and otherwise MUST forward them to the PKI
and forward responses to the pledge.
* Change "The registrar MAY offer different enrollment protocols" to
"The registrar MUST support at least one certificate enrollment
protocol ..."
* In response to review by Michael Richardson,
- slightly improve the structuring of the Message Exchange
Section 4.2 and add some detail on the request/response
exchanges for the enrollment phase
- merge the 'Enhancements to the Addressing Scheme' Section 4.3 with the subsequent one: 'Domain Registrar Support of
Alternative Enrollment Protocols'
- add reference to SZTP (RFC 8572)
- extend venue information
- convert output of ASCII-art figures to SVG format
- various small other text improvements as suggested/provided
* Remove the tentative informative application to EST-fullCMC
* Move Eliot Lear from co-author to contributor, add Eliot to the
acknowledgments
* Add explanations for terms such as 'target domain' and 'caPubs'
* Fix minor editorial issues and update some external references
IETF draft ae-01 -> ae-02:
* Architecture: clarify registrar role including RA/LRA/enrollment
proxy
* CMP: add reference to CoAP Transport for CMPV2 and Constrained
BRSKI
* Include venue information
From IETF draft 05 -> IETF draft ae-01:
* Renamed the repo and files from 'anima-brski-async-enroll' to
'anima-brski-ae'
* Added graphics for abstract protocol overview as suggested by
Toerless Eckert
* Balanced (sub-)sections and their headers
* Added details on CMP instance, now called BRSKI-CMP
From IETF draft 04 -> IETF draft 05:
* David von Oheimb became the editor.
* Streamline wording, consolidate terminology, improve grammar, etc.
* Shift the emphasis towards supporting alternative enrollment
protocols.
* Update the title accordingly - preliminary change to be approved.
* Move comments on EST and detailed application examples to
informative annex.
* Move the remaining text of section 3 as two new sub-sections of
section 1.
From IETF draft 03 -> IETF draft 04:
* Moved UC2-related parts defining the pledge in responder mode to a
separate document. This required changes and adaptations in
several sections. Main changes concerned the removal of the
subsection for UC2 as well as the removal of the YANG model
related text as it is not applicable in UC1.
* Updated references to the Lightweight CMP Profile (LCMPP).
* Added David von Oheimb as co-author.
From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:
* Housekeeping, deleted open issue regarding YANG voucher-request in
UC2 as voucher-request was enhanced with additional leaf.
* Included open issues in YANG model in UC2 regarding assertion
value agent-proximity and CSR encapsulation using SZTP sub
module).
From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:
* Defined call flow and objects for interactions in UC2. Object
format based on draft for JOSE signed voucher artifacts and
aligned the remaining objects with this approach in UC2 .
* Terminology change: issue #2 pledge-agent -> registrar-agent to
better underline agent relation.
* Terminology change: issue #3 PULL/PUSH -> pledge-initiator-mode
and pledge-responder-mode to better address the pledge operation.
* Communication approach between pledge and registrar-agent changed
by removing TLS-PSK (former section TLS establishment) and
associated references to other drafts in favor of relying on
higher layer exchange of signed data objects. These data objects
are included also in the pledge-voucher-request and lead to an
extension of the YANG module for the voucher-request (issue #12).
* Details on trust relationship between registrar-agent and
registrar (issue #4, #5, #9) included in UC2.
* Recommendation regarding short-lived certificates for registrar-
agent authentication towards registrar (issue #7) in the security
considerations.
* Introduction of reference to agent signing certificate using SKID
in agent signed data (issue #11).
* Enhanced objects in exchanges between pledge and registrar-agent
to allow the registrar to verify agent-proximity to the pledge
(issue #1) in UC2.
* Details on trust relationship between registrar-agent and pledge
(issue #5) included in UC2.
* Split of use case 2 call flow into sub sections in UC2.
From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:
* Update of scope in Section 1.1 to include in which the pledge acts
as a server. This is one main motivation for use case 2.
* Rework of use case 2 to consider the transport between the pledge
and the pledge-agent. Addressed is the TLS channel establishment
between the pledge-agent and the pledge as well as the endpoint
definition on the pledge.
* First description of exchanged object types (needs more work)
* Clarification in discovery options for enrollment endpoints at the
domain registrar based on well-known endpoints in Section 4.3 do
not result in additional /.well-known URIs. Update of the
illustrative example. Note that the change to /brski for the
voucher-related endpoints has been taken over in the BRSKI main
document.
* Updated references.
* Included Thomas Werner as additional author for the document.
From individual version 03 -> IETF draft 00:
* Inclusion of discovery options of enrollment endpoints at the
domain registrar based on well-known endpoints in Section 4.3 as
replacement of section 5.1.3 in the individual draft. This is
intended to support both use cases in the document. An
illustrative example is provided.
* Missing details provided for the description and call flow in
pledge-agent use case UC2, e.g. to accommodate distribution of CA
certificates.
* Updated CMP example in Section 5 to use Lightweight CMP instead of
CMP, as the draft already provides the necessary /.well-known
endpoints.
* Requirements discussion moved to separate section in Section 3.
Shortened description of proof-of-identity binding and mapping to
existing protocols.
* Removal of copied call flows for voucher exchange and registrar
discovery flow from [RFC8995] in Section 4 to avoid doubling or
text or inconsistencies.
* Reworked abstract and introduction to be more crisp regarding the
targeted solution. Several structural changes in the document to
have a better distinction between requirements, use case
description, and solution description as separate sections.
History moved to appendix.
From individual version 02 -> 03:
* Update of terminology from self-contained to authenticated self-
contained object to be consistent in the wording and to underline
the protection of the object with an existing credential. Note
that the naming of this object may be discussed. An alternative
name may be attestation object.
* Simplification of the architecture approach for the initial use
case having an off-site PKI.
* Introduction of a new use case utilizing authenticated self-
contain objects to onboard a pledge using a commissioning tool
containing a pledge-agent. This requires additional changes in
the BRSKI call flow sequence and led to changes in the
introduction, the application example,and also in the related
BRSKI-AE call flow.
* Update of provided examples of the addressing approach used in
BRSKI to allow for support of multiple enrollment protocols in
Section 4.3.
From individual version 01 -> 02:
* Update of introduction text to clearly relate to the usage of
IDevID and LDevID.
* Definition of the addressing approach used in BRSKI to allow for
support of multiple enrollment protocols in Section 4.3. This
section also contains a first discussion of an optional discovery
mechanism to address situations in which the registrar supports
more than one enrollment approach. Discovery should avoid that
the pledge performs a trial and error of enrollment protocols.
* Update of description of architecture elements and changes to
BRSKI in Section 4.1.
* Enhanced consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the
context of mapping the requirements to existing solutions in
Section 3 and in Section 5.
From individual version 00 -> 01:
* Update of examples, specifically suggestions for building automation as well
as two new application use cases in Appendix A.
* Deletion of asynchronous interaction with MASA to not complicate
the use case. Note that the voucher exchange can already be
handled in an asynchronous manner and is therefore not considered
further. This resulted in removal of the alternative path the
MASA in Figure 1 and the associated description in Section 4.1.
* Enhancement of description of architecture elements and changes to
BRSKI in Section 4.1.
* Consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the context of
mapping the requirements to existing solutions in Section 3.
* New section starting Section 5 with the mapping to existing
enrollment protocols by collecting boundary conditions. improvements.
Contributors
Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems
Richtistrasse 7
CH-8304 Wallisellen
Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 878 9200
Email: lear@cisco.com
Authors' Addresses
David von Oheimb (editor)
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com/
Steffen Fries
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: steffen.fries@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com/
Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com/